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BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a dismissal of the plaintiff's 
Complaint with prejudice for failing to prosecute. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the lower court abuse is discretion in dismissing the 
appellant's Complaint with prejudice for failure to prosecute? 
2. Did the lower court abuse its discretion in signing the 
Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and Order after the plaintiff 
filed an objection to said proposed documents? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review for a dismissal under Rule 41(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is abuse of discretion. Wilson v. 
Lambert, 613 P.2d 765 (Utah 1980). The appellant contends that 
entering an order over its objection creates an issue of law. The 
appellee disagrees with that position. The appellant's objections 
were to the proposed Findings of Facts and were all addressed to 
factual issues. Consequently, the standard of review is abusive 
discretion. In reviewing findings of fact, the appellate court's 
duty is to review the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
findings and to allow the findings to stand unless reasonable minds 
could differ. Marchant v. Park City, 771 P. 2d 677 (Utah App. 
1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Copper State Leasing Company, filed a Complaint 
against Kim C. Moore and other defendants on April 24, 1985, 
alleging liability arising out of a lease of equipment and personal 
guaranties. No action was taken on the case by the appellant and 
on the 1st day of December, 1986, the trial court issued an Order 
to Show Cause why the Complaint should not be dismissed for failing 
to prosecute. A hearing was set on this Order to Show Cause on 
January 7, 1987. On December 15, 1986, the appellant's counsel 
wrote a letter to the court agreeing to proceed with the case as 
soon as possible and with due diligence. No further action was 
taken on the case until a Motion for Summary Judgment was filed on 
November 19, 1990. On the 14th day of December, 1990, the appellee 
filed a motion for the court to dismiss the appellant's Complaint 
for failing to prosecute and latches. The court granted the 
appellee's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute. Counsel 
for the appellee submitted the appropriate Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order. The appellant filed an objection to 
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the Findings of Fact, and after having received the same, the court 
executed those Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Complaint in this action was filed in April of 1985 
seeking to collect from the defendant, Kim C. Moore, pursuant to 
an agreement guarantying a lease between the plaintiff and the 
defendant, Carver Hunter, Inc. The plaintiff had repossessed the 
property which was security for the lease and sought to obtain a 
deficiency judgment against Kim C. Moore with interest at the rate 
of 18 percent per annum. (R. 2-12) 
2. On the 1st day of December, 1986, an Order to Show Cause 
was issued by the court requiring the parties to show cause why the 
Complaint should not be dismissed for failing to prosecute and a 
hearing on said motion was set for January 7, 1987. (R. 33) 
3. The plaintiff wrote a letter to the court dated December 
15, 1986, in which the plaintiff committed itself to proceed with 
the case as soon as possible and with due diligence. (R. 34) 
4. Thereafter, no change was made in the pleadings and no 
further action was taken on the plaintiff's Complaint until the 
plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on November 19, 1990. 
(R. 38) The court found that the Motion for Summary Judgment could 
have been filed as of January of 1987 and that nothing changed 
between 1987 and 1990 as between the parties. (R. 179) 
5. The lease called for interest at the rate of 18 percent 
per annum and since 1986; thereby causing additional cost and 
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expense to the defendant if a judgment were to be obtained against 
him. (R. 179) 
6. The plaintiff sought to excuse its delay in prosecuting 
the case because of a bankruptcy that had been filed by other named 
defendants. Kim C. Moore did not file a bankruptcy and there was 
no federal stay order prohibiting the plaintiff from proceeding 
with its case in a timely manner. (R. 180) 
7. The plaintiff contended that it had assigned or 
transferred its right in the lease, which is the subject matter of 
the Complaint, to Lease West from August of 1986 to 1990. If that 
representation was true, then the lease had been assigned prior to 
the December 1, 1986 Order to Show Cause issued by the court and 
the December 15, 1986 letter from the plaintiff agreeing to proceed 
expeditiously on its case. (R. 180) 
8. The court found that the plaintiff had failed to timely 
prosecute its case and therefore the plaintiff's Complaint 
should be dismissed with prejudice. (R. 180) 
9. The appellee submitted the proposed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order to the appellant's counsel by mail on 
the 22nd day of March, 1991. The appellant filed objections to the 
proposed Findings of Fact, all of which related to Findings of 
Fact. Said objections were dated the 27th day of March, 1991. 
(R. 174-177) The trial court executed the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order on the 3rd day of April, 1991. (R. 
181) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
It is the appellee's position that the court acted within its 
discretion in dismissing the appellant's claim for failure to 
prosecute. The standard of review to be applied by the appellate 
court for dismissal under Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure is abuse of discretion. In this case a Complaint was 
filed in April of 1985 and no substantial action was taken by the 
appellant until December of 1990, approximately a period of five 
and one-half years. The court had previously notified the parties 
that the case was going to be dismiss for failing to prosecute in 
1986. A letter from appellant's counsel at that time indicated 
that the case would be prosecuted with due diligence. In spite of 
that letter, no action was taken for approximately four years. The 
Utah Appellate Courts have indicated that it is the burden of the 
plaintiff to prosecute a case in due course without unusual or 
unreasonable delay and that it is within the broad discretion of 
the trial court to dismiss a case for failure to prosecute. 
The appellee filed a motion to dismiss for failing to 
prosecute and on the theory of latches. The court did not rule on 
the issue of latches; and, consequently, any argument by the 
appellant in its Brief concerning this issue is not relevant. The 
appellant also has contended that the court committed error in 
failing to afford the appellant a hearing on his objections to 
appellee's Findings of Fact. Rule 4-504 does not provide that a 
district court judge must allow parties to file a memorandum or to 
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have a hearing on an objection. In addition, the appellant did not 
request such a hearing and did not file a motion under Rule 60(b) 
or Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Consequently, 
there is no basis upon which this court should reverse the trial 
court's decision because of the objection that was filed by the 
appellant. The trial court acted within its discretion in 
dismissing the appellant's Complaint and this court should uphold 
the trial court in its decision. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE 
APPELLANT'S CLAIM FOR FAILING TO PROSECUTE. 
The appellant has acknowledged that the standard of review to 
be applied by the appellate court for dismissal under Rule 41(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is abusive discretion. This 
court, in the case of Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P. 2d 237 (Utah App. 
1989) discussed the discretion of the court in dismissing a case 
for failing to prosecute. This court stated: 
It is well established that the trial court may, on its 
own motion, dismiss an action for want of prosecution 
under Rule 41(b) (Cites) This authority is an 'inherent 
power', governed not by rule or statute but by the 
control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own 
affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious 
disposition of cases. (cites) Therefore, the trial 
court has a reasonable latitude of discretion in 
dismissing for failure to prosecute if a party fails to 
move forward according to the rules and the directions 
of the court, without justifiable excuse. 
Id at 239. 
The appellate courts of this state have made similar rulings in the 
cases of Wilson v. Lambert, 613 P. 2d 765 (Utah 1980); Charlie Brown 
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Construction v. Leisure Sports, Inc., 740 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Utah 
App. 1987); Brasher Motor and Fin. Co. v. Brown, 461 P.2d 464, 464-
65 (1969). 
In this case, the trial court had entered an Order to Show 
Cause for failure to prosecute on the 1st day of December, 1986. 
(R. 33) That Order was dismissed upon the representations 
contained in a letter dated December 15, 1986, from the appellantfs 
counsel indicating that the case would be pursued with due 
diligence. (R. 34) Thereafter, no action was taken on the case 
until November 19, 1990, approximately four years after the letter 
and five and one-half years the filing of the Complaint. Clearly, 
the appellant did not move forward with the case in accordance with 
the rules and the direction of the court. The appellant gave no 
justifiable excuse for its failure to proceed with the action. 
The appellant contends that it had recently filed motions in 
this case, and therefore it was abuse of the court's discretion to 
dismiss for failing to prosecute. The plaintiff had not taken any 
action in this case between December 15, 1986 and November 21, 
1990. (R. 38) The appellee filed his Motion to Dismiss on 
November 28, 1990, and alleged therein that because of the delay, 
the appellee was prejudice because he could no longer locate the 
witnesses necessary to defend against the appellant's Complaint. 
(Exhibit A to appellant's Brief) Thereafter, the appellee retained 
counsel and filed a Motion for Dismissal dated the 14th day of 
December, 1990. (R. 124, Exhibit B to appellant's Brief). In that 
Motion the appellee specifically asked, "...for a dismissal of 
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plaintiff's Complaint for failure to prosecute,•.•" The appellant, 
in its Brief, contends that no such motion was made on behalf of 
the appellee and that the court granted dismissal for failure to 
prosecute sua sponte. (Appellant's Brief, P. 15). A number of 
cases have held that recent activity in a case will not prevent a 
court from dismissing a case for failing to prosecute. 
(a) In the case of Carter v. DeCarion, 400 S.2d 521 (Fla. 
App. D.3) the court found that a substitution of counsel one 
year prior to a motion to dismiss and the filing of a notice 
of deposition and settlement negotiations on the same day as 
the motion to dismiss did not justify the setting aside of a 
dismissal for lack of prosecution. 
(b) In Thompson v. Fleming, 401 Fed. 2d 266 (CA5 Miss. 
1968), the court stated it was not an abuse of discretion for 
a trial judge to dismiss a suit where plaintiff's counsel had 
moved for a continuance on the grounds that plaintiff's 
counsel had not been able to prepare for trial due to other 
pressing business matters. 
(c) In Bryne v. Amalgamated Transit Workers' Union Div., 
A.2d 503 (MD App. 1988), the court held that after notice of 
failure to prosecute had been given, further laxity on part 
of plaintiff's counsel may constitute basis for dismissing a 
cause of action. 
(d) In Timber Tracts, Inc. v. Fergus Electric Coop., 
753 P.2d 854 (Mont. 1988), the court held that dismissal for 
failure to prosecute will not be precluded, by a plaintiff's 
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assertion that he delayed action because he thought an 
automatic stay in bankruptcy court precluded further action. 
The court also stated that no reasonable excuse could be found 
for inactivity of attorneys in prosecuting a contract action 
over a period of six years. 
(e) In Wilson v. Lambert, 613 P.2d 765 (Utah 1980), the 
Utah Supreme Court affirmed a dismissal under URCP 41(b) 
despite the fact that plaintiff served interrogatories just 
two weeks prior to defendant's motion to dismiss for failure 
to prosecute. 
The Utah Court of Appeals in the case of Charlie Brown 
Construction v Leisure Sports, Inc., 740 P.2d 1368 (Utah App. 
1987), addressed a number of issues which have been raised by the 
appellant. In that case the plaintiff filed a Complaint on June 
15, 1981. On December 5, 1983, the court filed a sua sponte order 
to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for failing to 
prosecute. The parties stipulated that matter could be removed 
from the calendar. On June 15, 1984, plaintiff's counsel informed 
the court that a settlement was likely in the case. On June 18, 
1984, the matter was dismissed by the court. The plaintiff filed 
a motion to set aside the dismissal on February 25, 1985, which 
motion was denied. The Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal and 
stated that Pursuant to Rule 41(b) the court had the authority sua 
sponte to dismiss for lack of prosecution. The court also stated 
that a dismissal under Rule 41(b) operates as an adjudication upon 
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the merits unless otherwise ordered by the court. The court went 
on to state: 
fThe burden is upon the plaintiff to prosecute the case 
in due course without unusual or unreasonable delay.f 
Plaintiffs are required 'to prosecute their claims with 
due diligence or accept the penalty of dismissal1... 
Dismissal for failure to prosecute is a decision within 
the broad discretion of the trial court. This court will 
not interfere with that decision unless it clearly 
appears that the court has abused its discretion and that 
there is a likelihood and injustice has been wrought.... 
The appellant, in its Brief, contends that the defendant is 
obligated to proceed to developing its defense of the case; and if 
it fails to do so, is precluded from seeking a dismissal for 
failure to prosecute. Appellee appeared pro se. The appellee 
submitted a Request for Admission, Interrogatories, and a Motion 
to Produce to the appellant in 1985. The appellee was not 
represented by legal counsel until December of 1990 when a Motion 
for Dismissal was promptly filed. 
The appellant cites the case of Maxfield v. Rushton, Supra, 
in support of its position. In the Maxfield case there were 
numerous legal procedures engaged in prior to the court dismissing 
the case for failing to prosecute. In spite of that activity, the 
trial court's dismissal was upheld and the Court of Appeals stated: 
"A court's discretion, however, must be balanced against a higher 
priority: to 'afford disputants an opportunity to be heard and to 
do justice among them'...." It is the position of the appellee 
that over a period of five years the appellant had an opportunity 
to litigate this matter, but failed to pursue that opportunity and 
failed to honor the commitment which was previous made to the trial 
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court in 1986. The inactivity of the appellant must be balanced 
against an individual who was without legal counsel and lacked the 
basic knowledge of legal proceedings. Given the circumstances and 
the difference in the knowledge of the parties, justice requires 
that the trial court's dismissal be upheld. 
The Utah Appellate Court in Charlie Brown Construction v. 
Leisure Sports, Inc., Supra, and Maxfield v. Fishier, 538 P. 2d 
1323, 1325 (Utah 1975) has stated that the burden of prosecuting 
a case and proceeding without unusual or unreasonable delays rests 
with the plaintiff. Other courts have also so held. 
In Timber Tracts v. Fergus Electric Coop, Supra., the Montana 
Court stated: 
The burden is upon the plaintiff to demonstrate a 
reasonable excuse for his neglect. If the plaintiff 
fails to carry that burden, the delay is considered 
unreasonable and the defendant is presumed to have been 
prejudiced. 
A similar decision was reached in Rossi v. Mathers, 749 P.2d 964 
(Colo. App. 1987). In that case the court held that the plaintiff 
had not demonstrated that any diligent efforts had been made on her 
part to move the case forward over a period of three years from the 
filing of the Complaint, and that the burden was on the plaintiff 
to prosecute the case in due course without unusual or unreasonable 
delay. 
POINT II 
THE APPELLANT'S CLAIM WAS NOT DISMISSED 
ON THE THEORY OF LATCHES. 
The appellee filed a motion to dismiss the appellant's 
Complaint for failing to prosecute and on the theory of latches. 
11 
The court granted the appellee's motion based upon failure to 
prosecute. The court did not address whether or not the appellee 
was entitled to a dismissal on the theory of latches. The 
appellant, in its Brief, contends that the court did not have the 
authority to dismiss on the theory of latches and cites a number 
of cases for that issue. 
It is the position of the appellee, since the court did not 
address the issue of latches, that issue is not before this court 
and whether or not the trial court could have dismissed on the 
theory of latches is not relevant. Consequently, the appellee does 
not address that issue and does not respond to those cases cited 
by the appellant on the issue of latches. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN EXECUTING THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER. 
The appellee submitted Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and an Order pursuant to the direction of the trial judge. As 
indicated in the Statement of Facts, the said documents were mailed 
to counsel for the appellant on the 22nd day of March, 1991, 
pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
(Certificate contained on Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order, R. 178-181) Thereafter, the appellant filed an objection 
on the 27th day March, 1991, and the court signed the documents on 
April 3, 1991. (R. 174-177) 
Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
provides that a party may file a notice of objection. However, 
that rule does not indicate what procedure, if any, must be 
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followed by the parties or the court in relationship to said 
objection. If the appellant wanted a hearing on its objections to 
the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it could have 
requested such a hearing. Rules 4-501 and 4-502 of the Code of 
Judicial Administration provide specific procedures to be followed 
on motions and hearings. Those sections do not specifically apply 
to an objection filed under Rule 4-504; however, if requested, the 
court would probably have granted the appellant a right to file a 
memorandum in support of its objection and an oral argument. No 
such request was made by the appellant. Consequently, the court 
had the authority to consider the objection without additional 
input from either of the parties and to rule thereon. If the 
appellant believed that the court did not give due consideration 
to its objection, it had the right to file a motion under Rule 
60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and possible under Rule 
59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. A motion was not filed 
under either of these rules, 
discretion. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The appellant filed an action in this case in April of 1985 
and did not pursue the case until December of 1990, approximately 
five and one-half years. During this period of time, the court had 
previously moved to dismiss the case for failure to prosecute and 
the appellant's counsel, in December of 1986, had committed itself 
to proceed with due diligence. State law authorizes the court to 
dismiss a case for failure to prosecute if the plaintiff fails to 
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move forward with the case in due course without unusual or 
unreasonable delays. It is the appellee's position that the trial 
judge's decision was not an abuse of discretion and that the facts 
viewed most favorably in light of the appellee support that 
decision. The appellee respectfully requests that the court deny 
the relief sought by the appellant. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of October, 1991. 
ROBERT A. ECHARD 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify four (4) true and correct copies of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE was mailed, postage prepaid, this 
day of October, 1991 to the following: 
Mark S. Swan 
Mark E. Medcalf 
Attorneys for Appellant 
ROBERT A. ECHARD 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
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